EGT through Quantum Mechanics & from Statistical Physics to Economics by Guevara, Esteban
ar
X
iv
:0
70
5.
00
29
v1
  [
q-
fin
.G
N]
  3
0 A
pr
 20
07
EGT through Quantum Mechanics
& from Statistical Physics to Economics
Esteban Guevara Hidalgo†‡
†Departamento de F´ısica, Escuela Polite´cnica Nacional, Quito, Ecuador
‡SIO´N, Autopista General Rumin˜ahui, Urbanizacio´n Ede´n del Valle,
Sector 5, Calle 1 y Calle A # 79, Quito, Ecuador
By analyzing the relationships between a socioeconomical system modeled through evolutionary
game theory and a physical system modeled through quantum mechanics we show how although
both systems are described through two theories apparently different both are analogous and thus
exactly equivalents. The extensions of quantum mechanics to statistical physics and information
theory let us use some of their definitions for the best understanding of the behavior of economics and
biology. The quantum analogue of the replicator dynamics is the von Neumann equation. A system
in where all its members are in Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a system in a maximum entropy
state. Nature is a game in where its players compete for a common welfare and the equilibrium of
the system that they are members. They act as a whole besides individuals like they obey a rule in
where they prefer to work for the welfare of the collective besides the individual welfare.
PACS numbers: 03.65.-w, 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a, 89.65.Gh
I. INTRODUCTION
Why has it been possible to apply some methods of
statistical physics to economics and biology? It is a good
reason to say that physics is a model which tries to de-
scribe phenomena and behaviors and if this model fits
and describes almost perfectly the observed and the mea-
sured even in the economic world then there is no prob-
lem or impediment to apply physics to solve problems
in economics and biology. But, could economics, biology
and statistical physics be correlated? Could it have a
relationship between quantum mechanics and game the-
ory? or could quantum mechanics even enclose theories
like games and the evolutionary dynamics? This pos-
sibility could make quantum mechanics a theory more
general that we have thought.
Problems in economy and finance have attracted the
interest of statistical physicists. Ausloos et al [1] ana-
lyzed fundamental problems pertain to the existence or
not long-, medium-, short-range power-law correlations
in economic systems as well as to the presence of finan-
cial cycles. They recalled methods like the extended de-
trended fluctuation analysis and the multi-affine analysis
emphasizing their value in sorting out correlation ranges
and predictability. They also indicated the possibility of
crash predictions. They showed the well known financial
analyst technique, the so called moving average, to raise
questions about fractional Brownian motion properties.
The (m, k)-Zipf method and the i−variability diagram
technique were presented for sorting out short range cor-
relations.
J.-P. Bouchaud [2] analyzed three main themes in the
field of statistical finance, also called econophysics: (i)
empirical studies and the discovery of universal features
in the statistical texture of financial time series, (ii) the
use of these empirical results to devise better models of
risk and derivative pricing, of direct interest for the finan-
cial industry, and (iii) the study of “agent-based models”
in order to unveil the basic mechanisms that are respon-
sible for the statistical “anomalies” observed in financial
time series.
Statistical physicists are also extremely interested in
fluctuations [3]. One reason physicists might want to
quantify economic fluctuations is in order to help our
world financial system avoid “economic earthquakes”.
Also it is suggested that in the field of turbulence, we
may find some crossover with certain aspects of financial
markets.
Kobelev et al [4] used methods of statistical physics
of open systems for describing the time dependence of
economic characteristics (income, profit, cost, supply,
currency, etc.) and their correlations with each other.
They also offered nonlinear equations (analogies of known
reaction-diffusion, kinetic, Langevin equation) to de-
scribe appearance of bifurcations, self-sustained oscilla-
tional processes, self-organizations in economic phenom-
ena.
It is generally accepted that entropy can be used for
the study of economic systems consisting of large num-
ber of components [5]. I. Antoniou et al [6] introduced a
new approach for the presentation of economic systems
with a small number of components as a statistical sys-
tem described by density functions and entropy. This
analysis is based on a Lorenz diagram and its interpola-
tion by a continuous function. Conservation of entropy
in time may indicate the absence of macroscopic changes
in redistribution of resources. Assuming the absence of
macro-changes in economic systems and in related addi-
tional expenses of resources, we may consider the entropy
as an indicator of efficiency of the resources distribution.
2This approach is not limited by the number of compo-
nents of the economic system and can be applied to wide
class of economic problems. They think that the bridge
between distribution of resources and proposed probabil-
ity distributions may permit us to use the methods of
nonequilibrium statistical mechanics for the study and
forecast of the dynamics of complex economic systems
and to make correct management decisions.
Statistical mechanics and economics study big en-
sembles: collections of atoms or economic agents, re-
spectively. The fundamental law of equilibrium sta-
tistical mechanics is the Boltzmann-Gibbs law, which
states that the probability distribution of energy E is
P (E) = Ce−E/T , where T is the temperature, and C
is a normalizing constant. The main ingredient that is
essential for the derivation of the Boltzmann-Gibbs law
is the conservation of energy. Thus, one may generalize
that any conserved quantity in a big statistical system
should have an exponential probability distribution in
equilibrium [7]. In a closed economic system, money is
conserved. Thus, by analogy with energy, the equilibrium
probability distribution of money must follow the expo-
nential Boltzmann-Gibbs law characterized by an effec-
tive temperature equal to the average amount of money
per economic agent. Dra˘gulescu and Yakovenko demon-
strated how the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution emerges
in computer simulations of economic models. They con-
sidered a thermal machine, in which the difference of tem-
perature allows one to extract a monetary profit. They
also discussed the role of debt, and models with broken
time-reversal symmetry for which the Boltzmann-Gibbs
law does not hold.
Recently the insurance market, which is one of the im-
portant branches of economy, have attracted the atten-
tion of physicists [8]. Some concepts of the statistical
mechanics, specially the maximum entropy principle is
used for pricing the insurance. Darooneh obtained the
price density based on this principle, applied it to multi
agents model of insurance market and derived the utility
function. The main assumption in his work is the cor-
respondence between the concept of the equilibrium in
physics and economics. He proved that economic equi-
librium can be viewed as an asymptotic approximation to
physical equilibrium and some difficulties with mechani-
cal picture of the equilibrium may be improved by con-
sidering the statistical description of it. TopsØe [9] also
has suggested that thermodynamical equilibrium equals
game theoretical equilibrium.
In this paper we try to find a deeper relationship be-
tween quantum mechanics and game theory. By using
some elements of evolution that are contained inside evo-
lutionary game theory through the replicator dynamics,
game theory is generalized. Evolutionary game theory is
compared with quantum mechanics and it is shown how
although both systems analyzed are described through
two theories apparently different both are analogous and
thus exactly equivalents. So, we could make use of some
of their concepts, laws and definitions for the best under-
standing of the behavior of economics and biology. The
quantum analogue of the replicator dynamics is the von
Neumann equation. A system in where all its members
are in Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a system in a
maximum entropy state. Nature is a game in where its
players act as a whole besides individuals like they obey
a rule in where they prefer to work for the welfare of
the collective besides the individual welfare. Should a
socioeconomical system also satisfy a Collective Welfare
Principle?
II. CLASSICAL, EVOLUTIONARY &
QUANTUM GAMES
Game theory [10, 11, 12] is the study of decision mak-
ing of competing agents in some conflict situation. It tries
to understand the birth and the development of conflict-
ing or cooperative behaviors among a group of individu-
als who behave rationally and strategically according to
their personal interests. Each member in the group strive
to maximize its welfare by choosing the best courses of
strategies from a cooperative or individual point of view.
The central equilibrium concept in game theory is the
Nash Equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a set of
strategies, one for each player, such that no player has an
incentive to unilaterally change his action. Players are in
equilibrium if a change in strategies by any one of them
would lead that player to earn less than if he remained
with his current strategy. A Nash equilibrium satisfies
the following condition
E(p, p) ≥ E(r, p), (1)
whereE(si, sj) is a real number that represents the payoff
obtained by a player who plays the strategy si against
an opponent who plays the strategy sj . A player can not
increase his payoff if he decides to play the strategy r
instead of p.
Evolutionary game theory [13, 14, 15] does not rely
on rational assumptions but on the idea that the Dar-
winian process of natural selection [16] drives organisms
towards the optimization of reproductive success [17]. In-
stead of working out the optimal strategy, the different
phenotypes in a population are associated with the ba-
sic strategies that are shaped by trial and error by a
process of natural selection or learning. The natural se-
lection process that determines how populations playing
specific strategies evolve is known as the replicator dy-
namics [14, 15, 18, 19] whose stable fixed points are Nash
equilibria [11]. The central equilibrium concept of evolu-
tionary game theory is the notion of Evolutionary Stable
Strategy introduced by J. Smith and G. Price [13, 20].
3An ESS is described as a strategy which has the prop-
erty that if all the members of a population adopt it,
no mutant strategy could invade the population under
the influence of natural selection. ESS are interpreted as
stable results of processes of natural selection.
Consider a large population in which a two person
game G = (S,E) is played by randomly matched pairs of
animals generation after generation. Let p be the strat-
egy played by the vast majority of the population, and let
r be the strategy of a mutant present in small frequency.
Both p and r can be pure or mixed. An evolutionary
stable strategy (ESS) p of a symmetric two-person game
G = (S,E) is a pure or mixed strategy for G which sat-
isfies the following two conditions
E(p, p) > E(r, p),
If E(p, p) = E(r, p) then E(p, r) > E(r, r). (2)
Since the stability condition only concerns to alternative
best replies, p is always evolutionarily stable if (p, p) is
a strict equilibrium point. An ESS is also a Nash equi-
librium since is the best reply to itself and the game is
symmetric. The set of all the strategies that are ESS
is a subset of the NE of the game. A population which
plays an ESS can withstand an invasion by a small group
of mutants playing a different strategy. It means that if
a few individuals which play a different strategy are in-
troduced into a population in an ESS, the evolutionarily
selection process would eventually eliminate the invaders.
Quantum games have proposed a new point of view
for the solution of the classical problems and dilemmas
in game theory. Quantum games are more efficient than
classical games and provide a saturated upper bound for
this efficiency [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26].
III. REPLICATOR DYNAMICS & EGT
The model used in EGT is the following: Each agent
in a n-player game where the ith player has as strategy
space Si is modeled by a population of players which have
to be partitioned into groups. Individuals in the same
group would all play the same strategy. Randomly we
make play the members of the subpopulations against
each other. The subpopulations that perform the best
will grow and those that do not will shrink and eventu-
ally will vanish. The process of natural selection assures
survival of the best players at the expense of the others.
The natural selection process that determines how popu-
lations playing specific strategies evolve is known as the
replicator dynamics
dxi
dt
= [fi(x)− 〈f(x)〉]xi, (3)
dxi
dt
=

 n∑
j=1
aijxj −
n∑
k,l=1
aklxkxl

xi. (4)
The probability of playing certain strategy or the relative
frequency of individuals using that strategy is denoted
by frequency xi. The fitness function fi =
∑n
j=1 aijxj
specifies how successful each subpopulation is, 〈f(x)〉 =∑n
k,l=1 aklxkxl is the average fitness of the population,
and aij are the elements of the payoff matrix A. The
replicator dynamics rewards strategies that outperform
the average by increasing their frequency, and penal-
izes poorly performing strategies by decreasing their fre-
quency. The stable fixed points of the replicator dynam-
ics are Nash equilibria, it means that if a population
reaches a state which is a Nash equilibrium, it will re-
main there.
We can represent the replicator dynamics in matrix
form
dX
dt
= G+GT . (5)
The relative frequencies matrix X has as elements
xij = (xixj)
1/2
(6)
and
(
G+GT
)
ij
=
1
2
n∑
k=1
aikxkxij
+
1
2
n∑
k=1
ajkxkxji
−
n∑
k,l=1
aklxkxlxij (7)
are the elements of the matrix
(
G+GT
)
.
From this matrix representation we can find a Lax rep-
resentation of the replicator dynamics [27]
dX
dt
= [[Q,X ] , X ] , (8)
dX
dt
= [Λ, X ] . (9)
The matrix Λ is equal to Λ = [Q,X ] with
(Λ)ij =
1
2
[(
n∑
k=1
aikxk
)
xij − xji
(
n∑
k=1
ajkxk
)]
(10)
and Q is a diagonal matrix which has as elements
qii =
1
2
n∑
k=1
aikxk. (11)
4IV. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN QUANTUM
MECHANICS & GAME THEORY
In table 1 we compare some characteristic aspects of
quantum mechanics and game theory.
Table 1
Quantum Mechanics Game Theory
n system members n players
Quantum states Strategies
Density operator Relative frequencies vector
Von Neumann equation Replicator Dynamics
Von Neumann entropy Shannon entropy
System Equilibrium Payoff
Maximum entropy Maximum payoff
“Altruism” Altruism or selfish
Collective Welfare principle Minority Welfare principle
It is easy to realize the clear resemblances and appar-
ent differences between both theories and between the
properties both enjoy. This was a motivation to try to
find an actual relationship between both systems.
We have to remember that Schro¨dinger equation de-
scribes only the evolution of pure states in quantum me-
chanics. To describe correctly a statistical mixture of
states it is necessary the introduction of the density op-
erator
ρ(t) =
n∑
i=1
pi |Ψi(t)〉 〈Ψi(t)| (12)
which contains all the information of the statistical sys-
tem. The time evolution of the density operator is given
by the von Neumann equation
i~
dρ
dt
=
[
Hˆ, ρ
]
(13)
which is only a generalization of the Schro¨dinger equation
and the quantum analogue of Liouville’s theorem.
Evolutionary game theory has been applied to the so-
lution of games from a different perspective. Through the
replicator dynamics it is possible to solve not only evolu-
tionary but also classical games. That is why EGT has
been considered like a generalization of classical game
theory. The bonestone of EGT is the concept of evo-
lutionary stable strategy (ESS) that is a strengthened
notion of Nash equilibrium. The evolution of relative
frequencies in a population is given by the replicator dy-
namics. In a recent work we showed that vectorial equa-
tion can be represented in a matrix commutative form
(9). This matrix commutative form follows the same dy-
namic than the von Neumann equation and the proper-
ties of its correspondent elements (matrixes) are similar,
being the properties corresponding to our quantum sys-
tem more general than the classical system.
The next table shows some specific resemblances be-
tween quantum statistical mechanics and evolutionary
game theory.
Table 2
Quantum Statistical Mechanics Evolutionary Game Theory
n system members n population members
Each member in the state |Ψk〉 Each member plays strategy si
|Ψk〉 with pk → ρij si → xi
ρ,
∑
i ρii= 1 X,
∑
i xi= 1
i~dρdt=
[
Hˆ, ρ
]
dX
dt = [Λ, X ]
S = −Tr {ρ ln ρ} H = −
∑
i xi lnxi
Both systems are composed by n members (particles,
subsystems, players, states, etc.). Each member is de-
scribed by a state or a strategy which has assigned a de-
termined probability. The quantum mechanical system is
described by the density operator ρ whose elements rep-
resent the system average probability of being in a deter-
mined state. For evolutionary game theory, we defined
a relative frequencies matrix X to describe the system
whose elements can represent the frequency of players
playing a determined strategy. The evolution of the den-
sity operator is described by the von Neumann equation
which is a generalization of the Schro¨dinger equation.
While the evolution of the relative frequencies in a pop-
ulation is described by the Lax form of the replicator
dynamics which is a generalization of the replicator dy-
namics in vectorial form.
In table 3 we show the properties of the matrixes ρ and
X .
Table 3
Density Operator Relative freq. Matrix
ρ is Hermitian X is Hermitian
Trρ(t) = 1 TrX = 1
ρ2(t) 6 ρ(t) X2= X
Trρ2(t) 6 1 TrX2(t) = 1
Although both systems analyzed are described through
two apparently different theories (quantum mechanics
and game theory), both systems are analogous and thus
exactly equivalents [28, 29]. So, we can take some con-
cepts, laws and definitions from quantum mechanics and
physics for the best understanding of the behavior of
economics and biology. Quantum mechanics could be
used to explain more correctly biological and economical
processes and even it could encloses theories like games
and evolutionary dynamics [27, 28, 29]. This could make
quantum mechanics a more general theory that we had
thought. The resemblances between both systems and
the similarity in the properties of their corresponding el-
ements let us to define and propose the next quantization
relationships.
5V. QUANTUM REPLICATOR DYNAMICS &
QUANTIZATION RELATIONSHIPS
Let us propose the next quantization relationships
xi →
n∑
k=1
〈i |Ψk 〉 pk 〈Ψk |i 〉 = ρii,
(xixj)
1/2 →
n∑
k=1
〈i |Ψk 〉 pk 〈Ψk |j 〉 = ρij . (14)
A population will be represented by a quantum system
in which each subpopulation playing strategy si will be
represented by a pure ensemble in the state |Ψk(t)〉 and
with probability pk. The probability xi of playing strat-
egy si or the relative frequency of the individuals using
strategy si in that population will be represented as the
probability ρii of finding each pure ensemble in the state
|i〉 [27].
Through these quantization relationships the replica-
tor dynamics (in matrix commutative form) takes the
form of the equation of evolution of mixed states. And
also
X −→ ρ, (15)
Λ −→ −
i
~
Hˆ , (16)
where Hˆ is the Hamiltonian of the physical system.
The equation of evolution of mixed states from quan-
tum statistical mechanics (13) is the quantum analogue
of the replicator dynamics in matrix commutative form
(9) and both systems and their respective matrixes have
similar properties. Through these relationships we could
describe classical, evolutionary and quantum games and
also the biological systems that were described before
through evolutionary dynamics with the replicator dy-
namics.
VI. GAMES FROM QIT
Lets consider a system composed by N members, play-
ers, strategies, states, etc. This system is described com-
pletely through certain density operator ρ (12), its evo-
lution equation (the von Neumann equation) (13) and its
entropy. Classically, the system is described through the
matrix of relative frequencies X , the replicator dynam-
ics and the Shannon entropy. For the quantum case we
define the von Neumann entropy as [30, 31, 32, 33]
S = −Tr {ρ ln ρ} , (17)
and for the classical case
H = −
∑
i=1
xii lnxii (18)
which is the Shannon entropy over the relative frequen-
cies vector x ( the diagonal elements of X).
The time evolution equation of H assuming that x
evolves following the replicator dynamics is [28, 29, 31]
dH(t)
dt
= Tr
{
U(H˜ −X)
}
. (19)
H˜ is a diagonal matrix whose trace is equal to the Shan-
non entropy and its elements are h˜ii = −xi lnxi. The ma-
trix U has as elements Ui =
∑n
j=1 aijxj−
∑n
k,l=1 aklxlxk.
With the purpose of calculating the time evolution of
the von Neumann entropy we approximate the logarithm
of ρ by series [28, 29, 31] ln ρ = (ρ − I) − 1
2
(ρ − I)2 +
1
3
(ρ− I)3... and
dS(t)
dt
=
11
6
∑
i
dρii
dt
−6
∑
i,j
ρij
dρji
dt
+
9
2
∑
i,j,k
ρijρjk
dρki
dt
−
4
3
∑
i,j,k,l
ρijρjkρkl
dρli
dt
+ ζ. (20)
Entropy is the central concept of information theories.
The von Neumann entropy [32, 33] is the quantum ana-
logue of Shannon’s entropy but it appeared 21 years be-
fore and generalizes Boltzmann’s expression. Entropy
in quantum information theory plays prominent roles in
many contexts, e.g., in studies of the classical capacity
of a quantum channel [34, 35] and the compressibility of
a quantum source [36, 37]. Quantum information theory
appears to be the basis for a proper understanding of the
emerging fields of quantum computation [38, 39], quan-
tum communication [40, 41], and quantum cryptography
[42, 43].
In classical physics, information processing and com-
munication is best described by Shannon information
theory. The Shannon entropy expresses the average in-
formation we expect to gain on performing a probabilistic
experiment of a random variable which takes the values
si with the respective probabilities xi. It also can be seen
as a measure of uncertainty before we learn the value of
that random variable. The Shannon entropy of the prob-
ability distribution associated with the source gives the
minimal number of bits that are needed in order to store
the information produced by a source, in the sense that
the produced string can later be recovered.
We can define an entropy over a random variable SA
(player’s A strategic space) which can take the values{
sAi
}
(or {|Ψi〉}A) with the respective probabilities (xi)A
6(or
(
ρij
)
A
) [31]. We could interpret the entropy of our
game as a measure of uncertainty before we learn what
strategy player A is going to use. If we do not know what
strategy a player is going to use every strategy becomes
equally probable and our uncertainty becomes maximum
and greater while greater is the number of strategies. If
we would know the relative frequency with player A uses
any strategy we can prepare our reply in function of that
most probable player A strategy. Obviously our uncer-
tainty vanish if we are sure about the strategy our oppo-
nent is going to use.
If playerB decides to play strategy sBj against player A
which plays the strategy sAi our total uncertainty about
the pair (A,B) can be measured by an external “referee”
through the joint entropy of the system. This is smaller
or at least equal than the sum of the uncertainty about
A and the uncertainty about B. The interaction and the
correlation between A and B reduces the uncertainty due
to the sharing of information. The uncertainty decreases
while more systems interact jointly creating a new only
system. If the same systems interact in separated groups
the uncertainty about them is bigger. We can measure
how much information A and B share and have an idea of
how their strategies or states are correlated by its mutual
or correlation entropy. If we know that B decides to play
strategy sBj we can determinate the uncertainty about A
through the conditional entropy.
Two external observers of the same game can measure
the difference in their perceptions about certain strategy
space of the same player A by its relative entropy. Each
of them could define a relative frequency vector and the
relative entropy over these two probability distributions
is a measure of its closeness. We could also suppose that
A could be in two possible states i.e. we know that A can
play of two specific but different ways and each way has
its probability distribution (“state”) that also is known.
Suppose that this situation is repeated exactly N times
or by N people. We can made certain “measure”, ex-
periment or “trick” to determine which the state of the
player is. The probability that these two states can be
confused is given by the classical or the quantum Sanov’s
theorem.
VII. MAXIMUM ENTROPY & THE
COLLECTIVE WELFARE PRINCIPLE
We can maximize S by requiring that
δS = −
∑
i
δρii(ln ρii + 1) = 0 (21)
subject to the constrains δT r (ρ) = 0 and δ 〈E〉 = 0. By
using Lagrange multipliers∑
i
δρii(ln ρii + βEi + γ + 1) = 0 (22)
and the normalization condition Tr(ρ) = 1 we find that
ρii =
e−βEi∑
k e
−βEk
(23)
which is the condition that the density operator and its
elements must satisfy to our system tends to maximize
its entropy S. If we maximize S without the internal
energy constrain δ 〈E〉 = 0 we obtain
ρii =
1
N
(24)
which is the β → 0 limit (“high - temperature limit”) in
equation (23) in where a canonical ensemble becomes a
completely random ensemble in which all energy eigen-
states are equally populated. In the opposite low - tem-
perature limit β → ∞ tell us that a canonical ensemble
becomes a pure ensemble where only the ground state is
populated. The parameter β is related to the “tempera-
ture” τ as follows
β =
1
τ
. (25)
By replacing ρii obtained in the equation (23) in the
von Neumann entropy we can rewrite it in function of the
partition function Z =
∑
k e
−βEk , β and 〈E〉 through the
next equation
S = lnZ + β 〈E〉 . (26)
It is easy to show that the next relationships for the en-
ergy of our system are satisfied
〈E〉 = −
1
Z
∂Z
∂β
= −
∂ lnZ
∂β
, (27)
〈
∆E2
〉
= −
∂ 〈E〉
∂β
= −
1
β
∂S
∂β
. (28)
We can also analyze the variation of entropy with respect
to the average energy of the system
∂S
∂ 〈E〉
=
1
τ
, (29)
∂2S
∂ 〈E〉
2
= −
1
τ2
∂τ
∂ 〈E〉
(30)
and with respect to the parameter β
∂S
∂β
= −β
〈
∆E2
〉
, (31)
∂2S
∂β2
=
∂ 〈E〉
∂β
+ β
∂2 〈E〉
∂β2
. (32)
If our systems are analogous and thus exactly equiva-
lents, our physical equilibrium should be also absolutely
equivalent to our socieconomical equilibrium. If in an
7isolated system each of its accessible states do not have
the same probability, the system is not in equilibrium.
The system will vary and will evolution in time until it
reaches the equilibrium state in where the probability of
finding the system in each of the accessible states is the
same. The system will find its more probable configura-
tion in which the number of accessible states is maximum
and equally probable. The whole system will vary and re-
arrange its state and the states of its ensembles with the
purpose of maximize its entropy and reach its maximum
entropy state. We could say that the purpose and maxi-
mum payoff of a quantum system is its maximum entropy
state. The system and its members will vary and rear-
range themselves to reach the best possible state for each
of them which is also the best possible state for the whole
system. This can be seen like a microscopical cooperation
between quantum objects to improve its state with the
purpose of reaching or maintaining the equilibrium of the
system. All the members of our quantum system will play
a game in which its maximum payoff is the equilibrium of
the system. The members of the system act as a whole
besides individuals like they obey a rule in where they
prefer the welfare of the collective over the welfare of the
individual. This equilibrium is represented in the max-
imum system entropy in where the system “resources”
are fairly distributed over its members. A system where
its members are in Nash Equilibrium (or ESS) is exactly
equivalent to a system in a maximum entropy state [8, 9].
“A system is stable only if it maximizes the welfare of the
collective above the welfare of the individual. If it is max-
imized the welfare of the individual above the welfare of
the collective the system gets unstable and eventually it
collapses” (Collective Welfare Principle [27, 28, 29, 31]).
There exist tacit rules inside a system. These rules do
not need to be specified or clarified and search the system
equilibrium under the collective welfare principle. The
other “prohibitive” and “repressive” rules are imposed
over the system when one or many of its members violate
the collective welfare principle and search to maximize its
individual welfare at the expense of the group. Then it
is necessary to establish regulations over the system to
try to reestablish the broken natural order.
Fundamentally, we could distinguish three states in ev-
ery system: minimum entropy state, maximum entropy
state, and when the system is tending to whatever of
these two states. The natural trend of a physical system
is to the maximum entropy state. The minimum entropy
state is a characteristic of a “manipulated” system i.e.
externally controlled or imposed. The “globalization”
process has a behavior exactly equivalent to a physical
system that is tending to a maximum entropy state. So,
the analysis shown in this paper would predict the ap-
parition of big common markets and strong common cur-
rencies as the characteristics of a system that is tending
to that maximum entropy state. The system will find its
equilibrium by decreasing its number of currencies and
markets until it gets a state characterized by only one
common currency and only one common market.
VIII. THE WHY OF THE APPLICABILITY OF
STATISTICAL PHYSICS TO ECONOMICS
Quantum mechanics could be a much more general the-
ory that we had thought. It could encloses theories like
EGT and evolutionary dynamics and we could explain
through this theory biological and economical processes.
From this point of view many of the equations, concepts
and its properties defined quantically must be more gen-
eral that its classical versions but they must remain in-
side the foundations of the new quantum version. So, our
quantum equilibrium concept also must be more general
than the one defined classically.
In our model we represent a population by a quantum
system in which each subpopulation playing strategy si
is represented by a pure ensemble in the state |Ψk(t)〉 and
with probability pk. The probability xi of playing strat-
egy si or the relative frequency of the individuals using
strategy si in that population is represented by the prob-
ability ρii of finding each pure ensemble in the state |i〉.
Through these quantization relationships the replicator
dynamics (in matrix commutative form) takes the form
of the equation of evolution of mixed states. The quan-
tum analogue of the relative frequencies matrix is the
density operator. The relationships between these two
systems described by these two matrixes and their evo-
lution equations would let us analyze the entropy of our
system through the well known von Neumann entropy
in the quantum case and by the Shannon entropy in the
classical case. The properties that these entropies enjoy
would let us analyze a “game” from a different point of
view through information and a maximum or minimum
entropy criterion.
Every game can be described by a density operator,
the von Neumann entropy and the quantum replicator
dynamics. The density operator is maybe the most im-
portant tool in quantum mechanics. From the density
operator we can construct and obtain all the statisti-
cal information about our system. Also we can develop
the system in function of its information and analyze it
through information theories under a criterion of max-
imum or minimum entropy. There exists a strong re-
lationship between game theories, statistical mechanics
and information theory. The bonds between these theo-
ries are the density operator and entropy.
It is important to remember that we are dealing with
very general and unspecific terms, definitions, and con-
cepts like state, game and system. Due to this, the the-
ories that have been developed around these terms like
quantum mechanics, statistical physics, information the-
ory and game theory enjoy of this generality quality and
8could be applicable to model any system depending on
what we want to mean for game, state, or system. Objec-
tively these words can be and represent anything. Once
we have defined what system is in our model, we could try
to understand what kind of “game” is developing between
its members and how they accommodate their “states” in
order to get their objectives. This would let us visualize
what temperature, energy and entropy would represent
in our specific system through the relationships, proper-
ties and laws that were defined before when we described
a physical system.
Entropy can be defined over any random variable and
can be maximized subject to different constrains. In each
case the result is the condition the system must follow
to maximize its entropy. Generally, this condition is a
probability distribution function. For the case analyzed
in this paper, this distribution function depends on cer-
tain parameter “β” which is related inversely with the
system “temperature”. Depending on what the variable
over which we want determinate its grade of order or dis-
order is we can resolve if the best for the system is a state
of maximum or minimum entropy. If we would measure
the order or disorder of our system over a resources dis-
tribution variable the best state for that system is those
in where its resources are fairly distributed over its mem-
bers which would represent a state of maximum entropy.
By the other hand, if we define an entropy over an accep-
tation relative frequency of a presidential candidate in a
democratic process the best would represent a minimum
entropy state i.e. the acceptation of a candidate by the
vast majority of the population.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
By analyzing the relationships between the systems de-
scribed through quantum mechanics and game theory we
showed that both systems are analogous and thus ex-
actly equivalents. The extensions of quantum mechanics
to statistical physics and information theory let us use
some of their concepts and definitions for the best un-
derstanding of the behavior of economics and biology.
Quantum mechanics could be a much more general the-
ory that we had thought. It could encloses theories like
EGT and evolutionary dynamics.
Due to the generality of the terms state, game and
system, quantum mechanics, statistical physics, informa-
tion theory and game theory enjoy also of this generality
quality and could be applicable to model any system de-
pending on what we want to mean for game, state, or
system. Once we have defined what the term system is
in our model, we could try to understand what kind of
“game” is developing between its members and how they
accommodate its “states” in order to get their objectives.
Entropy can be defined over any random variable and
can be maximized subject to different constrains. De-
pending on what the variable over which we want deter-
minate its grade of order or disorder is we can resolve if
the best for the system is its state of maximum or min-
imum entropy. A system can be internally or externally
controlled with the purpose of guide it to a state of maxi-
mum or minimum entropy depending of the ambitions of
the members that compose it or the “people” who con-
trol it. Every “game” could be described by a density
operator with its entropy equal to von Neumann’s and
its evolution equation given by the quantum replicator
dynamics which is the von Neumann equation.
The quantum analogue of the replicator dynamics is
the von Neumann equation. A system in where all its
members are in Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a sys-
tem in a maximum entropy state. Nature is a game in
where its players compete for a common welfare and the
equilibrium of the system that they are members. They
act as a whole besides individuals like they obey a rule in
where they prefer to work for the welfare of the collective
besides the individual welfare. This equilibrium is rep-
resented in the maximum system entropy in where the
system “resources” are fairly distributed over its mem-
bers. A system is stable only if it maximizes the welfare
of the collective above the welfare of the individual. If
it is maximized the welfare of the individual above the
welfare of the collective the system gets unstable and
eventually it collapses.
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